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This paper analyzes the effects of technological risk on long-run growth when labor
supply is elastic and production gives rise to a pollution externality. We show that the
randomness of production, as well as the endogeneity of labor supply, affects the
equilibrium solutions for the social planner and for the market economy. We analyze the
effects of environmental policy, discuss conditions for an optimal policy, and find that the
response of labor supply to changes in the model parameters and to variations in the
policy instruments crucially depends on the volatility of output.
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1. INTRODUCTION
When the fast growing body of literature dealing with economic growth and envi-
ronmental externalities is reviewed, one feature is common to most contributions:
economic outcomes are assumed to be deterministic. Although most economists
would agree that this assumption is not very realistic, it has been dominating
not only the environmental growth literature, but growth literature in general.
Usually, the seeming contradiction between theory and reality has been justified
by arguing that uncertainty may cause short-term economic fluctuations, but mean
growth remains unaffected in the long run. Yet risk can affect long-run growth
via various channels, e.g., by inducing precautionary savings or influencing the
optimal labor–leisure choice. By integrating uncertainty in the form of aggregate
technology shocks into an endogenous model with pollution, we show in this paper
The authors would like to thank two anonymous referees for helpful comments and suggestions. Address corre-
spondence to: Karen Pittel, Ifo Institute for Economic Research and University of Munich, Poschingerstr. 5, 81679
Munich, Germany; e-mail: pittel@ifo.de.
c© 2010 Cambridge University Press 1365-1005/10 31
Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1365100509990988
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. ZHAW HochschulbibliothekE-Medienstelle/, on 28 Aug 2018 at 08:16:51, subject to the
32 CHRISTIANE CLEMENS AND KAREN PITTEL
that uncertainty matters for the long-run development of the economy as well as
for the implications of environmental policy.
To exemplify the relevance of our analysis, consider the consequences of climate
change for the frequency of extreme weather events. The IPCC (2007), as well
as Stern (2006), predicts that the volatility of temperatures and precipitation, and
extreme weather events, will rise due to climate change. Environmental shocks
such as storms, however, constitute one important source of aggregate technol-
ogy shocks. Because the extent of climate change depends on the level of CO2-
generating production, the volatility of output increases in a growing economy.
To show the implications of such an increase for the growth path of an economy
as well as the implications of environmental policy, in this paper we consider
aggregate multiplicative technology shocks.
We argue that the consideration of uncertainty is of particular significance in the
presence of environmental externalities. Concentrating on aggregate technological
shocks as the source of uncertainty, we show that uncertainty affects the optimal
static as well as the dynamic characteristics of optimal policy, not only quantita-
tively but also qualitatively. For example, in a deterministic setting, internalization
of the pollution externality unambiguously increases labor supply. Yet this may
not hold, given technological risk. Whether employment increases or decreases
due to internalization depends crucially on the volatility of production: the higher
the volatility, the more likely labor supply is to decrease with the degree of
internalization. Consequently, a policy maker who strives to increase employment
by raising environmental taxes could accomplish the opposite if he neglected the
impact of technological risk.
We also show that the volatility of shocks matters with respect to vulnerability
to pollution. In the absence of risk, a higher pollution elasticity of production,
i.e., a higher vulnerability, is always harmful to optimal employment and growth.
Consequently, a developing country whose economy depends more on environ-
mentally sensitive sectors suffers more from pollution than, e.g., an industrialized
economy. Yet, if risk is included in the analysis, a higher pollution elasticity might
decrease growth less than in a deterministic setting, whereas employment could
even be higher.
Our model is a stochastic version of the Romer (1986) endogenous growth
model with endogenous labor supply and a negative pollution externality. Pollution
is generated from production activities and can be reduced by devoting part of
output to abatement. Production and abatement are subject to a random disturbance
that stems from an aggregate productivity shock. The economy follows a stochastic
trend with the assumed uncertainty leading to second-order effects on expected
labor supply and growth. The relatively simple model structure with constant
private returns to scale and linearity in capital allows us to derive closed-form
solutions. In contrast to the main body of literature in this field, we assume labor
supply to be endogenously determined. We show that neglecting the reaction of
the labor–leisure choice to changes in environmental policy may result in a wrong
assessment of policy implications.1
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The mutual interdependence of economic growth and the environment has been
addressed extensively in the recent literature. It has especially been the develop-
ment of endogenous growth theory that has renewed interest in this field, leading
to a broad analysis not only of long-run growth under environmental restrictions,
but also of different types of environmental policies [e.g., Gradus and Smulders
(1993); Grimaud (1999); Schou (2000, 2002); Grimaud and Rouge´ (2005); Groth
and Schou (2007)].2 The vast majority of this literature, however, does not consider
the effects of uncertainty, but rather assumes that economic as well as ecological
components are deterministic. There are some exceptions, however. Baranzini and
Bourguignon (1995), for instance, consider a nonzero probability of extinction,
whereas Beltratti et al. (1998) and, more recently, Ayong Le Kama and Schubert
(2004) include uncertainty about future preferences. Optimal timing of environ-
mental policies under ecological as well as economic uncertainty is considered
by Pindyck (2002). Ecological uncertainty thus refers to uncertainty with respect
to ecosystem development, whereas economic uncertainty relates to uncertainty
about future costs and benefits of environmental damages.
Technically closest to our analysis is probably Soretz (2003, 2004, 2007), who
discusses perception and policy issues of environmental pollution in an AK-type
framework, but disregards trade-off effects between consumption and leisure, as
well as how individual households’ savings decisions relate to a differentiated
factor income risk.
In this paper, we combine the traditional environmental economics literature
on growth and the environment with the strand of literature dealing with labor
supply in a stochastic setting. The analysis is motivated by the well-known result
from the literature that the riskiness of capital returns and labor income is an
important determinant of the intertemporal savings decision of risk averse agents.
In his pioneering work, Leland (1968) stressed the role of precautionary savings
that a risk-averse household additionally undertakes in order to self-insure against
the riskiness of future income flows. In the context of modern growth theory, this
draws a link between intertemporal choice, risk, and growth. Sandmo (1970) was
the first to point out the importance of factor-specific risk related to the degree of
risk aversion for the emergence of precautionary saving.
The majority of recent contributions dealing with continuous-time stochastic
growth, where the economy follows a stochastic trend, confine their analysis
to a single income type (mostly capital risk), in order to maintain analytical
tractability [cf. Turnovsky (1993); Obstfeld (1994); Smith (1996)]. Others ei-
ther view the intertemporal flow of labor income as human wealth and treat it
as a “quasi-accumulating” hedgeable asset [Corsetti (1997)], or assume labor
incomes to be instantaneously deterministic [Turnovsky (2000, 2003)]. Notable
exceptions for the case of inelastic labor supply are Clemens and Soretz (2004)
and Clemens (2004, 2005). Recently, Turnovsky and Smith (2006) and Clemens
(2009) succeeded in deriving closed-form solutions for the equilibrium growth
path of an economy with endogenous labor–leisure choice, where households are
simultaneously subject to capital and income risk.
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Besides the phenomenon of precautionary savings, the presence of risk sub-
stantially alters the policy implications derived for a deterministic environment.
This is due to the fact that taxes (or transfers, respectively) also affect the riskiness
of the policy target under consideration. The insurance effect of taxation in a
nonenvironmental setting was first discussed by Domar and Musgrave (1944)
and Stiglitz (1969), or in a continuous-time growth context by Turnovsky (1993),
Smith (1996), or Clemens and Soretz (1997).
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 introduces the model. In Section 3,
we determine the socially optimal growth path as a benchmark solution. Section 4
focuses on the market economy. We derive conditions for an optimal policy
mix and discuss the general implications of regulatory activities on growth
and labor supply. Section 5 concludes. Technical details are relegated to the
Appendix.
2. THE MODEL
We assume a closed economy in which a homogeneous good is produced from
labor and capital. We consider a large number of identical firms. Individual pro-
duction is stochastic; i.e., with each increment of time, the economy is subject to an
aggregate productivity shock. The production and investment processes generate
two types of externalities: First, we assume that production is subject to learning
by doing. Production of a single producer is positively affected by aggregate
production experience, and investment activities in privately owned capital create
a positive externality by raising the productivity of all firms. For simplicity it is
assumed that this positive spillover effect is represented one to one by the aggregate
level of capital input. This is the standard type of Romer (1986) model. A second
externality arises from aggregate environmental pollution, ¯P(t).3 Production leads
to a flow of pollution, generating a negative effect on production, which can be
mitigated by abatement activities. The production technology is assumed to be of
the stochastic Cobb–Douglas type,
dY (t) = K(t)α ¯K1−α[1 − l(t)]1−α ¯P(t)−η [dt + dz(t)] , α ∈ (0, 1), η ∈ (0, 1).
(1)
dz(t) is the serially uncorrelated increment to a standard Wiener process z(t)
with zero mean and an instantaneous variance of σ 2dt . Due to the productivity
shock, the returns to the two factors of production are stochastic. In the terms
of Sandmo (1970), the household is subject to a capital risk and an income
risk.
To generate the instantaneous output flow dY (t), producers employ physical
capital, K(t), and labor, 1− l(t), as a fraction of time endowment. The production
displays constant returns to scale in K(t) and 1 − l(t) on the individual firm level.
Aggregate capital accumulation, ¯K(t), exerts a positive effect on productivity. We
normalize the population to unity, such that K(t) equals ¯K(t). Production is linear
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in capital on the aggregate level, which ensures that the conditions for ongoing
growth of per capita incomes are met. This, together with the assumption that
the productivity shock is proportional to the mean rate of output, implies that the
randomness of production does not disappear asymptotically as output grows. The
economy evolves according to a stochastic trend.
The negative pollution externality is represented by P(t), with the impact
weight on aggregate output measured by the partial elasticity −η. Pollution is
generated by production activities and can be reduced by devoting a share of
output to abatement. For simplicity we assume a one–to–one relationship between
the nonenvironmental part of production and unabated pollution. The effective
flow of pollution is given by the ratio of mean output to abatement A:
P(t) = K(t)
α
¯K(t)1−α[1 − l(t)]1−α
A(t)
. (2)
The form of pollution addressed in our paper encompasses all types of flow
pollution (e.g., noise) but may also serve as an approximation for pollution that is
assimilated or decomposed in a short amount of time (e.g., air pollution).4
Following Smulders and Gradus (1996), we assume an elasticity of substitution
of unity between abatement and raw pollution as a prerequisite for balanced
growth to be consistent with nonincreasing effective pollution in the long run. As
we assume perfect competition with a large number of producers, the effect of
individual production on aggregate pollution is negligible, so that, on the indi-
vidual level, producers take pollution as exogenous to their production decision.
Consequently, producers would not—in the absence of environmental regulation—
conduct abatement, as their perceived marginal return would be zero, and effective
pollution would asymptotically grow to infinity. Along the equilibrium growth
path, aggregate pollution, ¯P , should be constant.
The economy is populated by a continuum [0, 1] of identical infinitely lived in-
dividuals who maximize their intertemporal utility out of consumption and leisure,
E0
∫ ∞
0
[
ln C(t) + l(t)
1−δ
1 − δ
]
e−βtdt, if δ > 0, δ = 1, (3)
and E0
∫∞
0 [ln C(t) + ln l(t)] e−β tdt , if δ = 1. l(t) denotes leisure time, with δ
measuring the household’s dislike of labor. C(t) is individual consumption and
β the intertemporal rate of time preference.
This intertemporal utility function has a number of important characteristics:
First, (3) is log-linear in consumption. Households are risk averse and the Arrow–
Pratt measure of relative risk aversion equals unity. From the literature on pre-
cautionary savings under uncertainty [cf. Levhari and Srinivasan (1969); Sandmo
(1970)], it is well known for this case that the intertemporal income and substitution
effects from changes in the interest rate and hence from capital risk completely
offset each other. In a model without a preference for leisure, the randomness
of production would then generate certainty-equivalence results regarding the
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allocation of personal income on consumption and saving. The equilibrium ex-
pected growth rate of this economy would be identical to the growth rate of a
deterministic economy, although the household would still suffer a welfare loss
due to the presence of uncertainty. Because our model also takes risky labor
incomes into account, the chosen specification allows us to focus entirely on the
growth and policy effects of labor income risk. As will become obvious below, the
riskiness of wage incomes affects the labor–leisure choice and influences optimal
pollution as well as optimal pollution taxation.
Second, by assuming the preferences of agents to be additively separable,
the cross derivatives vanish and the effects of leisure on the marginal utility
of consumption and vice versa are eliminated. Finally, (3) is consistent with a
balanced growth path, along which the time share devoted to leisure as well as
the return to capital is constant, whereas consumption grows at a constant rate [cf.
King and Rebelo (1999)].
The aggregate capital stock follows the Itoˆ diffusion process,
d ¯K(t) = d ¯Y (t) − ¯C(t)dt − ¯A(t) [dt + dzA(t)], (4)
where ¯A(t) denotes aggregate abatement expenditure, which also follows a
stochastic process dzA(t) to be endogenously determined at equilibrium.
We now proceed with the derivation of the Pareto-optimal growth path of the
economy, which serves as a benchmark solution. The subsequent sections then
are devoted to the analysis of an economic and environmental policy aiming
at mimicking the Pareto-optimal path. It will be shown that the Pareto-efficient
allocation can be implemented by means of a subsidy on physical capital and
a pollution tax giving rise to incentives to engage in abatement, combined with
lump-sum payments. Two instruments will be sufficient to induce the efficient
time path in a knife-edge scenario.
3. SOCIAL PLANNER
3.1. Optimization and Balanced Growth Path
The benevolent social planner internalizes the two externalities present in the
economy and also takes account of the fact that the diffusion process of abatement
is governed by the exogenous productivity shock, such that dzA(t) = dz(t). In
contrast to individual producers, who only take account of the private returns to
capital, the social planner considers the social return and chooses the intertemporal
consumption path, the working time, and the abatement efforts so that the spillover
effects are internalized, and capital is paid its social return. In contrast to the
standard Romer (1986) model, where the private return unambiguously falls short
of the social returns to investment, this is not necessarily the case in our setting,
the results depending on whether the positive learning spillovers are outweighed
by the negative effects from pollution.
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The maximization problem of the social planner reads5
max
C,l
E0
∫ ∞
0
[
ln C + l
1−δ
1 − δ
]
e−βtdt, (5)
s.t. dK = dY − Cdt − A (dt + dz) , K(0) > 0, z(0) = 0. (6)
The stochastic Hamiltonian can be set up as follows Malliaris and Brock (1982,
Ch. 2.10):6
H
(
C,K,A, l, λ,
∂λ
∂K
)
= e−βt
(
ln C + l
1−δ
1 − δ
)
+ λ
{[
K(1 − l)(1−α)](1−η) Aη − C − A}+ σ 2K
2
∂λ
∂K
,
with σ 2K = {[K(1 − l)(1−α)](1−η)Aη − A}2σ 2. Maximization yields the following
FOCs:
∂H
∂C
= e−βtC−1 − λ = 0 (7)
∂H
∂l
= e−βt l−δ − λ(1 − η)(1 − α)K(1 − l)−αaη
×
[
1 + ∂λ
∂K
K
λ
(1 − l)1−ασ 2 (aη − a)
]
= 0 (8)
∂H
∂A
= (ηaη−1 − 1)λ
[
1 + ∂λ
∂K
K
λ
(1 − l)1−ασ 2 (aη − a)
]
= 0 (9)
dλ = −∂H
∂K
dt + ∂λ
∂K
σKdz
= −λ
{
(1 − η)(1 − l)1−αaη
[
1 + ∂λ
∂K
K
λ
(1 − l)1−α (aη − a) σ 2
]
dt
− ∂λ
∂K
K
λ
(1 − l)1−α (aη − a) dz
}
, (10)
where a = 1/ ¯P denotes the abatement ratio, together with the transversality
condition
lim
t→∞ Et [λ(t)K(t)] = 0. (11)
Conditions (7) and (8) relate the marginal utility of consumption and leisure,
respectively, to the shadow price λ, but (8) also accounts for the random nature of
labor productivity. The optimal level of abatement activities follows from condition
(9). Equation (10) is a modified version of the optimality condition usually derived
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for the state variable K . It describes the stochastic evolution of the shadow price
over time, which also follows a diffusion process.
The term (aη − a)(1 − l)1−αK in (8)–(10) will turn out to be crucial for the
following analysis. It represents the part of output that is available for consumption
and investment after abatement has been conducted to keep pollution and its
negative productivity effects at bay, and can therefore be considered as “net”
output. The term is also equal to σK/σ , and due to its linearity in the capital stock,
it reflects the economy evolving according to a stochastic trend with σK growing
over time.
The solution procedure for the stochastic system (7)–(10) is similar to the well–
known one for deterministic models. We proceed with differentiating (7) with
respect to time to obtain a second expression for the law of motion of the shadow
price λ, which can then be equated to (10). Application of Itoˆ’s lemma yields the
following expression for dλ:
dλ = e−βtC−1
[
−βdt − dC
C
+ (dC)
2
C2
]
. (12)
With aggregate output being subject to a technological disturbance, consumption
and saving are stochastic too. The associated diffusion process for consumption,
dC, can be obtained by applying Itoˆ’s lemma:
dC = C ′(K)dK + 12C ′′(K)(dK)2. (13)
A balanced growth path of the economy is characterized by a time-invariant
expected growth rate. For this reason, the consumption–wealth ratio, µ = C/K
and the abatement ratio, a, as well as the time fractions allotted to labor and
leisure, l and 1 − l, have to be constant over time, too. The solution conjecture of
a time-invariant µ is consistent with the underlying isoelastic preferences [Eaton
(1981); Merton (1982)]. We postulate C ′(K) = µ, C ′′(K) = 0, dC = µdK , and
(dC)2 = µ2(dK)2. Using the Itoˆ multiplication rules7 finally yields
dλ
λ
= {−β + µ − (1 − l)1−α (aη − a) [1 − σ 2(1 − l)1−α (aη − a)]} dt
− (1 − l)1−α (aη − a) dz. (14)
Equating (10) to (14) and sorting with respect to deterministic and stochastic
components results in{
− β + µ + a(1 − l)1−α (1 − ηaη−1)+ σ 2(1 − l)2(1−α) (aη − a)
×
[
aη − a + (1 − η) aη ∂λ
∂K
K
λ
]}
dt = −aη(1 − l)1−α
(
∂λ
∂K
K
λ
+ 1
)
dz.
(15)
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For µ to be nonstochastic over time, the random components on the RHS of (15)
have to exactly offset each other, which is only the case if the elasticity of the
shadow price with respect to capital equals the elasticity of marginal utility with
respect to consumption, the latter being equal to unity in the case of log-utility:
− ∂λ
∂K
K
λ
= 1. (16)
Employing this condition and rearranging finally gives the following expression
for the consumption–capital ratio, reflecting the consumption–saving trade-off:8
µ∗1 = β + a(1 − l)1−α(ηaη−1 − 1)
[
1 − σ 2(1 − l)1−α (aη − a)] . (17)
Going back to the first-order condition related to the labor–leisure choice, (8),
utilizing (16), and rearranging, we derive a second condition for µ, this time
reflecting the consumption–leisure trade-off
µ∗2 =
(1 − α) lδ
(1 − l)α (1 − η) a
η
[
1 − σ 2(1 − l)1−α (aη − a)] . (18)
To have a feasible allocation characterized by a positive value of (18), and given
η < 1, the last term on the RHS has to be of positive sign. By (10), we find that
this condition is only met if the certainty equivalent to capital return,
r∗s = (1 − η)aη(1 − l)1−α
[
1 − σ 2(1 − l)1−α (aη − a)] , (19)
is positive. The certainty equivalent is the real interest rate of a (hypothetical)
safe asset, which falls below the rental rate to capital r = (1 − η)aη(1 − l)1−α
by the amount of the risk premium σ 2aη(1 − η)(1 − l)2(1−α) (aη − a), because
risk-averse households demand a higher expected return for bearing the risk of
accumulation.9
Equations (16) and (19) can now be used to derive results regarding the optimal
level of abatement activities in terms of an optimal abatement ratio. From (9)
follows
PROPOSITION 1. Abatement is conducted optimally if the marginal damage
generated by pollution equals the marginal costs of abatement: i.e., for an optimal
abatement ratio,
a∗ = η 11−η . (20)
We find da∗/dη > 0 and d2a∗/dη2 < 0.
Proposition 1 states a condition that is well known from the nonstochastic model.
The optimal abatement ratio a∗ is solely determined by the pollution elasticity of
production. The more vulnerable output is with respect to pollution, the higher the
abatement ratio, i.e., the higher the share of production which has to be spent on
abatement activities.
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Using this information allows us to rewrite (17) and (18):
µ∗1 = β, (21)
µ∗2 = lδ
(1 − α)(1 − η)η η1−η
(1 − l)α
[
1 − σ 2(1 − l)1−α(1 − η)η η1−η
]
. (22)
µ∗1 and µ∗2 are functions of the model primitives and the time allocation only. They
have to be equal to be consistent with balanced growth, which also implies that
the time share devoted to leisure has to be time-invariant, too. Because (22) is a
nonlinear function in working time, the optimal time allocation is only implicitly
determined by µ∗1 = µ∗2.
Equation (21) also reflects the well-known certainty equivalent result, which
is typical for logarithmic preferences. Because the social planner internalizes the
external effects, capital accumulation is rewarded by the social return to capital,
which amounts to a pure capital risk.10 The optimal consumption–capital ratio is
solely determined by the rate of time preference, and the intertemporal income and
substitution effects originating from the riskiness of the income source exactly off-
set each other. This also implies that the household’s consumption–accumulation
decision is independent of the pollution generated through production.
By equating (21) and (22), we get an expression implicitly describing the optimal
allocation of time to labor and leisure in the Pareto-efficient economy:
l−δ = (1 − α)(1 − η)η
η
1−η
β(1 − l)α
[
1 − σ 2(1 − l)1−α(1 − η)η η1−η
]
. (23)
An equilibrium growth path is characterized by capital and consumption grow-
ing at a common stochastic rate, that is, dK/K = dC/C. The equilibrium expected
growth rate can be derived by employing the aggregate resource constraint, (4),
together with (21) and (22), and taking expectations. We obtain two expressions
for the optimal expected growth rate, which—similarly to the consumption–capital
ratios µ∗1 and µ∗2—implicitly determine the equilibrium allocation of labor:
g∗1 = (1 − η)η
η
1−η (1 − l)1−α − β, (24)
g∗2 = (1 − η)η
η
1−η (1 − l)1−α
{
1 − (1 − α) l
δ
1 − l
[
1 − σ 2(1 − η)η η1−η (1 − l)1−α
]}
.
(25)
The expected growth rate (24) reflects the well-known result that per capita in-
comes in the economy are growing at a constant positive rate if the (social) return
to capital exceeds the rate of time preference. There are no direct higher-order
effects from the variance of the productivity shock and the associated capital risk on
expected growth because the intertemporal income and substitution effects exactly
offset each other. Indirectly, the expected growth rate depends on the variance of
the technological disturbance via optimal labor supply. A closer inspection of
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(25) shows that here, too, a positive certainty equivalent is crucial for a feasible
allocation.
The economy is in equilibrium if the two growth rates are equal, i.e., g∗1 = g∗2 =
g∗, or equivalently if
∗ ≡ g∗1 − g∗2 = −β +
(1 − α)(1 − η)η η1−η lδ
(1 − l)α
×
[
1 − σ 2(1 − η)η η1−η (1 − l)1−α
]
= 0. (26)
PROPOSITION 2. A unique balanced growth path exists if
(i) rs > 0 ,
(ii) ∗ is a continuous and monotonic function in the domain l ∈ (0, 1), and
(iii) the limits of ∗ are of opposite sign:
sgn lim
(1−l)→0
∗ = −sgn lim
(1−l)→1
∗. (27)
Proof. Differentiation of (26) with respect to 1 − l gives
∂∗
∂(1 − l) = −(1 − α)l
δ
⎧⎨
⎩ rs1 − l
(
δ
l
+ α
1 − l
)
+ α
[
(1 − η)η η1−η σ
(1 − l)α
]2⎫⎬
⎭ .
For rs > 0, ∗ is monotonically decreasing in 1− l. The limits of ∗ with respect
to (1 − l) → 0 and (1 − l) → 1 are given by
lim
(1−l)→0
∗ = ∞ and lim
(1−l)→1
∗ = −β.
The allocation is feasible for positive values of µ∗, g∗, and l∗ and if the transver-
sality condition (11) is satisfied, so that the utility integral (5) converges and the
maximized value of expected lifetime utility after substitution of the equilibrium
values of the macroeconomic variables is given by
V (0) = 1
β2
{
β
[
ln µ∗ + ln K(0)]+ β l∗1−δ
1 − δ + g
∗
− 1
2
(1 − η)2η 2η1−η (1 − l)2(1−α)σ 2
}
> 0.
If households have no preference for leisure, the entire time endowment is
devoted to working, so that l = 0. Equations (20) and (21) show immediately that
the optimal abatement ratio a∗ and the optimal consumption–capital ratio µ∗ are
unaffected by the endogeneity of labor supply. The major difference between the
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two settings can be found in the expected growth rate of the economy. This takes
on its certainty equivalent level g∗(l = 0) = (1 − η)ηη/1−η − β.
Although the optimal share of output devoted to abatement activities remains
unchanged, optimal expected growth is higher in the exogenous labor case due to
the increase in labor input:
g∗(l = 0) − g∗ = (1 − η)η η1−η [1 − (1 − l)1−α] > 0. (28)
3.2. Comparative-Static Results for the Pareto-Efficient Allocation
Whereas the optimal consumption–capital ratio (21) is only determined by the
rate of time preference, optimal growth and leisure also depend on the remaining
model parameters. By employing the implicit function theorem, we can show how
optimal labor input (23) and (indirectly) expected growth (24) respond to changes
in the model parameters. We focus especially on η, which reflects the vulnerability
of production with respect to pollution; σ 2, measuring the impact of changes in
the riskiness of production; and finally δ, representing the elasticity of marginal
utility with respect to leisure.
PROPOSITION 3. Optimal labor supply and the expected growth rate of the
economy respond to changes in the model primitives according to
(i)
d(1 − l∗)
dσ 2
< 0,
d(1 − l∗)
dδ
< 0 ,
d(1 − l∗)
dη
 0
for 1  2σ 2(1 − l)1−α(1 − η) η η1−η ; (29)
(ii)
dg∗
dσ 2
< 0 ,
dg∗
dδ
< 0 ,
dg∗
dη
< 0. (30)
Proof. See Appendix A.1.
Changes in η. Equation (29) shows that the growth effect of an increase in
the pollution elasticity of output is unambiguously negative, whereas the response
of optimal labor supply is of ambiguous sign. An increase in η implies that the
economy becomes more vulnerable with respect to pollution. Identical amounts
of pollution cause higher damages in terms of foregone output, so that it is optimal
for the social planner to increase optimal abatement [see (20)] in order to reduce
pollution.
To explain the ambiguity of adjustments in labor supply following a change in
η, first consider as a reference the riskless economy, that is, the case of σ = 0.
Here, we find an unambiguously negative impact of larger values of η on labor
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supply and growth. A higher η negatively affects the marginal products of input
factors, making it optimal to substitute labor for more leisure. Both, the decline in
working time and the increase in optimal abatement, reduce growth.
This causality chain—reflecting first-order effects from the mean—is generally
maintained in the stochastic environment, but is additionally augmented by second-
order effects from the variance of the technology shock, which also affect marginal
labor productivity and consequently labor supply. To understand these second-
order effects, note that the FOCs with respect to consumption and leisure, (7) and
(8), can be equated and rearranged to relate the marginal rate of substitution to the
risk–adjusted marginal product of labor,11
Ul
UC
= Yl ×
[
1 − σ 2(1 − l)1−α(1 − η)η η1−η
]
, (31)
which responds to changes in η. As can be seen, the ratio of marginal utili-
ties is lower under risk if compared to the riskless economy. The second-order
term related to the instantaneous variance of the productivity shock, σ 2, enters
negatively into the expression on the RHS side of equation (31). It reflects the
risk-averse household’s response to the presence of stochastic capital and labor
incomes and the associated consumption risk. Bearing in mind that leisure is a
riskless activity, the household’s decision is biased toward enjoying more leisure
in a risky compared to a riskless environment.
The second-order term decreases with a rise in η, generally implying an increase
in the expression on the RHS of (31). To maintain equality, the marginal rate of
substitution has to adjust accordingly, meaning an increase of Ul relative to UC .
Concavity implies that a decrease in UC is accompanied by more consumption,
less leisure, and consequently an increase in labor supply.
Associated feedback effects on expected growth mitigate the overall decline in
growth, but never outweigh the first-order effects stemming from mean returns.
Consequently, a more pollution-sensitive economy always grows at a lower rate.
Changes in δ. Other things equal, an increase in δ raises marginal utility of
leisure; see (29). This induces the social planner to substitute leisure for labor. The
negative growth effect of (30) derives directly from the decline in labor supply.
There are no second-order effects associated with a change in δ.
Changes in σ 2. Equation (29) shows that the socially optimal labor supply
responds qualitatively similarly to an increase in the variance of the technology
shock and to an increase in the utility parameter δ. In the presence of logarithmic
preferences with respect to consumption, an increase in σ 2 does not have an effect
on the household’s optimal propensity to consume. Nevertheless, second-order
effects from the productivity shock on the labor–leisure trade-off can be observed.
The increase in σ 2 lowers the RHS of (31) and affects the shadow price between
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consumption and leisure. Here, the effects already described for a change in η are
reversed.
The marginal rate of substitution, Ul/UC , decreases only if the marginal utility
from labor declines relative to the marginal utility of consumption. Given con-
cavity of utility, this is only the case if leisure time increases. The risk-averse
household responds to the increase in income risk and associated consumption
risk by extending its demand for the safe activity, i.e., leisure.
The associated decrease in working time causes negative growth effects [see
(30)], which follow directly from (24). It reduces net output (output minus abate-
ment effort), while leaving µ∗ unchanged at the cost of savings and growth.
4. THE MARKET ECONOMY
4.1. Policy Instruments
We now proceed with the discussion of the market economy. Households ulti-
mately own firms. Because we initially assumed all individuals to be identical,
we will confine our analysis to the representative consumer, who chooses his
intertemporal consumption flow, working and leisure time, and abatement efforts
to maximize his intertemporal welfare (3) subject to his budget constraint, while
treating public policy as exogenously given.
We assume that the household is subject to environmental taxation. As a firm
owner, it pays a pollution tax at the rate τp, but disregards its individual contribution
to the overall level of pollution as a byproduct of production activities. Because
the firm-specific flow of pollution, P(t), generated throughout the production
process, is also subject to the aggregate technological disturbances, we postulate
the following diffusion for individual tax payments:
dT p(t) = τpP (t) [dt + dz(t)] . (32)
We assume identical rates for the taxes levied on the deterministic and the random
components of pollution.12
The household receives a subsidy on capital accumulation. Subsidy payments
are proportional to the level of physical capital at the rate τ k and follow the
diffusion
dT k(t) = τ kK(t) [dt + dz(t)] . (33)
Net government revenues (may they be positive or negative) are redistributed
to households in a lump-sum fashion.
The representative agent maximizes welfare (3) subject to his budget constraint,
dK(t) = dY (t) − C(t)dt − A(t) (dt + dz) − dT p(t) + dT k(t) + dT (t). (34)
The government balances its budget in each period of time. There is no gov-
ernment debt or surplus, so the diffusion of lump-sum payments T (t) follows
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residually from (32) and (33),
dT (t) = dT p(t) − dT k(t), (35)
and, depending on the expenditure and revenue flows, can be stochastic too.
In contrast to a riskless environment, taxation and subsidization both target
equally mean economic activities and random fluctuations around the mean. Al-
though the technology shock has zero mean, the variance of the capital stock
increases over time. Neglecting the stochastic structure of production and abate-
ment in the policy mix would leave polluting economic activities partly untaxed,
and these effects would accumulate over time. As the social planner takes account
of the technology risk in his allocation decisions, a fiscal policy solely targeted at
mean economic activities would run short of its goal and would never be sufficient
to fully internalize the external effects.
4.2. Macroeconomic Equilibrium
The solution procedure is similar to the one already outlined above. The details of
optimization are given in Appendix A.2. We start the discussion of the macroeco-
nomic equilibrium with the determination of factor prices. The equilibrium values
of factor prices can be obtained by the usual marginal productivity conditions of
the firm problem. Taking account of (1) and the fact that ¯K = K and ¯P = 1/a in
equilibrium, the pretax values of the expected return to capital and the expected
wage rate can be obtained as
r = α(1 − l)1−αaη and w = (1 − α)(1 − l)−αaηK. (36)
The expected rate of return to physical capital is constant in macroeconomic
equilibrium and differs from the expected social return r∗ = (1 − η)ηη/(1−η)(1 −
l)1−α , because agents of the market economy disregard both their own contribution
to the formation of the aggregate capital stock, which exerts a positive knowledge
externality, and their impact on aggregate pollution and the associated negative
externality. The expected wage rate grows linearly in the capital stock.
By also taking account of the policy instruments, we are able to derive the
following expression for the post-tax certainty equivalent to capital return in the
decentralized economy:
rs =
[
αaη(1 − l)1−α + τ k − ατ
p
aK
] [
1 − σ 2(1 − l)1−α (aη − a)] . (37)
The equilibrium riskless rate rs nicely demonstrates the multiple ways fiscal
policies affect accumulation in a risky environment. The two policy instruments
have a twofold impact on the riskless rate. Both affect the mean return as well
as the risk premium on capital holdings, the latter capturing the second-order
effects stemming from the variance of the technological disturbance.13 The first
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expression on the RHS equals net mean return to capital, which is positively
affected by the subsidy and negatively by the pollution tax.
In the first place, we have the well-known result that a subsidy paid on capital
accumulation makes savings more attractive by an increase in mean capital return.
Second, a subsidy also increases the volatility of future capital income flows,
which risk-averse agents dislike, and ultimately is reflected by an increase in the
risk premium on capital holdings.
The sign of effects reverses when it comes to the pollution tax. Being tied to
current production and putting a burden on capital accumulation, the pollution tax
reduces the mean return as well the volatility of future real interest incomes. This
leads to a lower risk premium on capital accumulation.
To have a positive value of the certainty equivalent to capital return, we need the
first-order effects to prevail, so that the last term on the RHS of (37) is of positive
sign.14
Following the solution procedure described for the social optimum in the pre-
ceding section, we also obtain two expressions for the equilibrium consumption–
capital ratio. By additionally taking into account that the government has to run a
balanced budget, we arrive at
µ1 = β +
{[
(1−α)aη−a] (1−l)1−α−τ k + ατp
aK
} [
1−σ 2(1−l)1−α (aη−a)].
(38)
As before, the second expression for µ can be obtained from the first-order con-
dition for leisure:
µ2 = (1 − α) l
δ
1 − l
[
aη(1 − l)1−α − τ
p
aK
] [
1 − σ 2(1 − l)1−α(aη − a)]. (39)
A comparison between the consumption–capital ratio chosen by the benevolent
social planner µ∗1 = β and the one of the decentralized market economy, (38),
illustrates the impact of factor income risk on intertemporal consumption choice.
Whereas the social planner rewards capital with its social return—which equals
the value of output—and therefore indirectly neglects labor income risk, labor
and capital inputs of the market economy are paid according to private marginal
productivity. The intertemporal income and substitution effects related to capital
risk still offset each other, but we no longer observe the certainty equivalent result
that the consumption–capital ratio is unaffected by risk (reflected in the second-
order terms). We find that µ1 increases with mean labor income, measured by the
term [(1 − α) aη − a](1 − l)1−α , and decreases with labor income risk, measured
by the second-order term −(1 − l)2(1−α)(aη − a)σ 2 [(1 − α) aη − a].
As Leland (1968) pointed out, decreasing absolute risk aversion is necessary
and sufficient for households to save out of precautionary motives in the presence
of a pure income risk. This condition is met for any positive value of the coefficient
of relative risk aversion, which in our model equals unity by the assumption of log
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utility in consumption. Furthermore, as demonstrated by Levhari and Srinivasan
(1969) and by Sandmo (1970), households have to be sufficiently risk-averse in
the presence of a pure capital risk to undertake buffer-stock savings, which for
the underlying isoelastic preferences corresponds to all values of relative risk
aversion larger than unity. There is no savings effect from the riskiness of capital
incomes for log-utility in consumption. Consequently, if we observe any impact
from risk on intertemporal consumption choice, this can be attributed entirely to
the presence of labor income risk.
For any given policy mix not mimicking the Pareto-efficient allocation, the
effects of labor income risk on consumption and saving prevail and we find µ1
to be smaller if compared to a riskless environment (i.e., σ = 0). This indicates
the presence of precautionary savings that the household undertakes in order to
self-insure against the fluctuations of future income flows.
This also implies that the consumption–accumulation decision of the household
now depends not only on the pollution elasticity of production and the other model
parameters, but also on the tax and subsidy rates. The underlying tax–transfer
system indirectly redistributes income between labor and capital. It subsidizes ac-
cumulation while simultaneously taxing pollution, which is created as a byproduct
of private capital and labor inputs in production. From the first-order condition
for abatement activities (see Appendix A.2), we are able to derive an expression
for the optimal relation between τp and a,
0 =
(
τp
A
− a
) [
1 − σ 2(1 − l)1−α (aη − a)], (40)
which is satisfied only for a positive value of rs , if τp = aA. From (40), it can be
seen that a constant abatement ratio over time is only consistent with household
optimization if tax payments increase over time. Due to the accumulation of
capital, the marginal value of a unit of pollution rises over time. To keep pollution
from growing over time, its costs in terms of the tax have to rise as well [see also
Pittel (2002)]. At the same time, the tax on pollution serves as an implicit subsidy
on abatement, which increases in a growing economy. Along any balanced path,
the growth rate of the tax has to be equal to the joint growth rate of abatement and
capital. From τp = aA it follows immediately that tax revenues exactly suffice to
pay for abatement expenditures.
Equation (38) shows that a constant propensity to consume, which is a prereq-
uisite for balanced growth, requires the subsidy rate on capital to be constant over
time. However, although the rates of the two policy instruments develop differently
over time, the growth rates of tax revenues and subsidy payments are of course
identical. For τ k the subsidy basis grows at the same rate as the pollution tax.
Nevertheless, a balanced budget of the regulating authority without any lump-sum
transfers, i.e., T = 0, can only hold for an optimal policy in a knife-edge case, as
will be shown below.
We conclude the discussion of the macroeconomic equilibrium with the corre-
sponding expressions for the expected growth rate of the decentralized economy,
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which can be obtained from the resource constraint (34) for a balanced government
budget and the two expressions for the propensity to consume, (38) and (39):
g1 = (1 − l)1−α(aη − a) − µ1, (41)
g2 = (1 − l)1−α(aη − a) − µ2. (42)
The impact of risk, which negatively affects consumption, is of opposite sign in
the expected growth rate of the economy (41), thereby indicating the presence
of precautionary saving, which is empirically supported, e.g., by Zeldes (1989),
Caballero (1990), and Hubbard et al. (1994).
The economy is in equilibrium if the two growth rates are equal, i.e., g1 = g2 =
g, which implicitly determines the equilibrium level of labor supply,
 ≡ g1 − g2 = −β +
{
1 − σ 2(1 − l)1−α [(τpA)η − τpA]}
×
{
(1 − l)1−α(1 − α) [(τpA)η − τpA]
(
lδ
1 − l − 1
)
+ τ k
}
= 0, (43)
where we considered τp = aA from (40) and define τpA ≡ τp/A for notational
convenience. τpA can be considered as the tax per unit of abatement activities, i.e., a
normalized tax that is constant over time. The associated conditions for existence
and uniqueness of a macroeconomic equilibrium along the balanced growth path
closely resemble those stated for the Pareto-efficient solution in Proposition 2 and
therefore are relegated to Appendix A.3.
For the case of exogenous labor supply, it follows from (40) that the equilibrium
abatement ratio is entirely determined by the chosen tax policy, that is, a = τpA ,
and therefore is unaffected by the labor–leisure choice. For this reason, we would
observe identical (expected) pollution levels in the exogenous and endogenous
labor setting and an identical first-best policy, expressed by the normalized tax
τ
p∗
A = η1/(1−η).
This is, however, true only for the normalized rate τpA . The nonnormalized
tax payments, τp = η1/(1−η)A, will differ between the two scenarios, because
A follows a different time path. Recalling that optimal growth is higher in the
exogenous labor case, tax payments τp, too, will grow at a larger rate in the case
of inelastic labor supply.
The optimal capital subsidy, however, is larger for the case of inelastic la-
bor supply, the difference between optimal rates being given by (1 − α)(1 −
η)ηη/(1−η)
[
1 − (1 − l)1−α] > 0. This result can be explained by taking account
of the fact that cross partial derivatives are positive in production technology. The
larger the labor inputs, the larger the productivity gain from the technological
externality, and the larger the wedge between private and social return, which has
to be closed by the subsidy.
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4.3. The Optimal Policy
By choosing a policy mix that completely internalizes the pollution and capital
externalities, governmental regulation can induce socially optimal growth in the
market economy. The respective optimal rates of the pollution tax and the capital
subsidy can be shown to follow the same general rules as in a standard deterministic
economy.
PROPOSITION 4. An optimal policy mix is characterized by a capital sub-
sidy and a pollution tax whose rates are equalized to the respective marginal
externalities of pollution and capital:
τp∗ = ηaηA and τ k∗ = (1 − η)(1 − α)aη(1 − l)1−α. (44)
Proof. Insert τp∗A and τ k∗ into (38) and (39) to retrieve the two expressions for
the socially optimal propensity to consume, (21) and (22). Substitution of these
expressions into (41) and (42) gives (24) and (25). Substituting (44) into (40)
yields the familiar condition
a
(
ηaη−1 − 1) [1 − σ 2(1 − l)1−α (aη − a)] = 0,
which is identical to (9). Consequently we get for the above described policy
a = a∗.
Following Proposition 4, the optimal capital subsidy rate is constant over time
while the optimal pollution tax rises with A. The latter result is due to optimal
pollution being constant and therefore getting more and more “scarce” over time.
To keep pollution at its optimal level P ∗, the tax τp∗ has to increase to induce
firms to increase their abatement activities over time. Governmental expenditures
and revenues develop at identical growth rates. On the one hand, the subsidy rate
on capital is time-invariant, whereas its base grows at rate g∗. On the other hand,
the pollution tax base is kept constant with a growing tax rate.
Regarding (44), it can be seen that the pollution externality affects the optimal
level of the capital subsidy. In contrast to an economy without pollution, the
learning-by-doing spillover in our economy has a twofold effect on production:
The positive direct effect on the social return and an indirect negative effect from
the repercussions of capital accumulation on pollution. The optimal subsidy rate
in (44) corrects for the net of the two effects.
Regarding lump-sum transfers we find
COROLLARY 1. Lump-sum transfers (taxes) T are nonzero except for the
knife-edge case, where the negative pollution externality is exactly offset by the
positive net capital externality, i.e., iff
η = (1 − η)(1 − α).
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In all other cases the following holds:
T ≷ 0 ⇐⇒ η ≷ (1 − η)(1 − α).
Although implementing optimal policy regimes leads to the welfare maximum,
it is well observable that governments choose nonoptimal policy strategies for a
number of reasons. Imperfect information about pollution damages or costs of
abatement, as well as lobbying activities, only constitute some of the reasons be-
hind these decisions. An interesting issue is therefore to consider the consequences
of deviations from optimal policies for growth as well as labor supply. For this
reason, we proceed in the following section with the analysis of the effects of
changes in policies when policy instruments are not set at their optimal level.
4.4. Comparative Statics for the Policy Instruments
To compute the comparative statics of l and g, we equate µ1 to µ2 from (38) and
(39), and additionally consider τp = aA, such that15
β = {1 − σ 2(1 − l)1−α [(τpA)η − τpA]}
×
{
(1 − l)1−α(1 − α) [(τpA)η − τpA]
(
lδ
1 − l − 1
)
+ τ k
}
. (45)
As β > 0 and rs > 0 for feasibility reasons, the second term on the RHS is
positive in equilibrium. Employing the implicit function theorem, we can derive
the following comparative static results for the policy instruments:
PROPOSITION 5. Equilibrium labor supply and growth increase in the neigh-
borhood of the social optimum with a rise in the subsidy rate paid on capital
accumulation. The effect of a change in the pollution tax, as measured by τpA ,
depends on whether the taxation exceeds or falls short of its optimal level. If the
technological risk becomes too large, the response of equilibrium labor supply to
an increase in the pollution tax may switch its sign:
(i)
d(1 − l)
dτ k
> 0,
d(1 − l)
dτpA
 0 for τpA  τp∗A if 1 > 2σ 2(1 − l)1−α
[(
τ
p
A
)η − τpA] ,
d(1 − l)
dτpA
 0 for τpA  τp∗A if 1 
 2σ 2(1 − l)1−α
[(
τ
p
A
)η − τpA] .
(46)
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(ii)
dg
dτ k
∣∣∣∣
τ
p∗
A , τ
k∗
> 0,
dg
dτpA
∣∣∣∣
τ
p∗
A , τ
k∗
 0 for τpA  τp∗A .
(47)
Proof of Proposition 5. See Appendix D. 
Proposition 5 states that—depending on the chosen policy—labor supply and
growth can be higher or lower in the market economy than in the social optimum.
Changes in τpA . Whether labor supply is higher or lower than in the social
optimum depends on whether or not the chosen policy overshoots or falls below
its optimal value, i.e., τp∗A  τ
p
A . Yet the direction in which labor supply responds
to changes in τpA depends on the volatility of the technology shock, σ 2. Given that
the technological risk is relatively low, effects from the mean dominate effects
from the stochastic component and the qualitative reaction of policy changes is
the same as in a riskless economy. If, however, the technological risk is high,
second-order effects can dominate. In this case the response of labor supply to a
change in pollution is reversed.
Assume for the moment that σ 2 is low. In this case, the farther away from its
optimal value the chosen tax rate is, the more labor supply falls short of its optimal
level. If the tax rate is below its optimum, i.e., τpA < τ
p∗
A , abatement is suboptimally
low, while pollution is too high. Consequently, the returns to labor fall short of
the optimum and households substitute leisure for labor. The suboptimally low
labor supply and the excess pollution both reduce growth. If, conversely, τpA > τ
p∗
A
holds, abatement activities exceed their optimal level and factor returns again are
suboptimally low, such that labor supply as well as growth decrease. Changing the
tax rate toward its optimal level will in both cases increase labor supply as well as
growth (see Figure 1a).
Interestingly, the response of labor supply to a rise in the pollution tax might be
reversed if the technological risk is sufficiently high (see Figure 1b). For τpA < τp∗A ,
a rise in the tax rate raises net output as well as the volatility of production, which
induces an increase in precautionary savings. In case this increase is sufficiently
strong, the effect on the marginal return to labor is reversed and labor supply
decreases. Still, with respect to growth the decrease in labor supply can never
outweigh the positive effects of additional abatement, such that growth rises due
to the increase in taxation.
Changes in τ k . Assume now that the incomplete internalization of the capital
externality gives rise to distortions (τ k = τ k∗). In this case, the equilibrium labor
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FIGURE 1. Local behavior of growth rates and labor supply for a variation of τpA around the
social optimum.
supply in the market economy is below the optimal level, if τ k is below its optimal
level. For τ k = τ k∗, labor supply becomes optimal, and for a further rise in the
subsidy, labor supply rises to a suboptimally high level. The deviation of labor
supply from its optimum level also determines whether the expected market growth
rate exceeds or falls short of its optimum; i.e., g  g∗ for τ k  τ k∗.
The intuition behind this result is that an increase in the subsidy on capital returns
leads to an increase in capital formation and higher marginal factor returns. The
increase in returns fosters growth in two ways: Higher returns to capital induce
households to save more and lower their propensity to consume. Additionally,
higher returns to labor induce households to substitute leisure for labor, which
additionally enhances growth. Note that the effect on labor and growth is lower
in the presence of technological risk. As the households’ propensity to consume
is always lower in the presence of risk (due to precautionary savings), an increase
in the marginal return to capital decreases µ by less than under certainty; i.e., the
“leverage effect” of an increase in the marginal return is lower.
5. CONCLUSIONS
This paper analyzes the effects of technological risk on long-run growth when
labor supply is elastic and production gives rise to two types of externalities. On
the one hand, production generates a flow of pollution that the individual producer
takes as exogenous, which can be reduced by abatement activities. On the other
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hand, the input of capital induces a positive knowledge spillover. By considering
additively separable preferences with respect to consumption and leisure, and by
specifically assuming log-utility in consumption, growth effects of technology
shocks can entirely be attributed to labor income risk.
Our analysis covers the socially optimal as well as the decentralized balanced
growth path. We find that the optimal abatement ratio is constant along the balanced
path and solely determined by the pollution elasticity of output. Whether an
increase in the pollution elasticity affects labor supply positively or negatively
crucially depends on the magnitude of risk, as measured by the variance of the
technology shock. If production is deterministic, optimal labor supply and growth
decrease due to an increase in the pollution sensitivity of production. If production
is stochastic, second-order effects emerge and positively affect optimal labor
supply. For a variance of the technology shock that is sufficiently high, these
effects might prevail and give rise to an increase in labor supply.
We derive conditions for optimal policy design in the market economy, such
that the decentralized allocation replicates the social optimum. The randomness
of output requires optimal policy schemes to include a stochastic component in
order to take account of the rising volatility of output. We assume the special case
of deterministic and stochastic activities to be taxed/subsidized at uniform rates
and leave the analysis of differentiated policy instruments for future research. A
policy in the underlying setting is optimal if the tax on pollution and the subsidy
on capital accumulation are set equal to their respective marginal externalities.
Furthermore, we examine more general properties of nonoptimal taxation and
subsidy policies. We demonstrate that these properties can, but do not necessarily,
coincide with the policy implications from nonstochastic models of pollution
and growth. The inclusion of technology shocks might lead to a reversal of the
responses of labor supply to changes in the policy variables. With respect to
growth, however, stochastic effects never outweigh deterministic effects and the
comparative statics of growth are of unambiguous sign.
Pollution in our model is assumed to be a flow variable, thereby allowing a
straightforward integration of our setting into the existing literature on stochastic
growth. Modeling pollution or resources as stock variables might, however, give
rise to interesting additional insights. The consideration of risky stocks seems to be
a promising field for future research, especially in the context of climate change.
NOTES
1. For a general overview of the role of uncertainty in environmental economics, see Pindyck
(2006).
2. An extensive review of the related literature can be found in Pittel (2002).
3. Bars indicate aggregate values of variables.
4. We model pollution in our paper as a flow variable, as this somewhat reduces the complexity of the
analytical analysis. However, Smulders and Gradus (1996) have shown in the context of deterministic
growth models that the qualitative implications of a flow or stock formulation are equivalent as long
as the focus is on balanced growth, which is the case in our paper.
5. In what follows, we drop the time index of variables for expository convenience.
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6. See Turnovsky and Smith (2006) for a solution procedure applying the stochastic Bellman
equation.
7. dt × dt = 0, dzi × dzj = ρij σiσj dt for i = j , and dzi × dzj = σ 2dt for i = j .
8. In what follows, asterisks denote the Pareto-efficient values of the macroeconomic variables.
9. The safe asset is purely hypothetical, because we are dealing with an aggregate risk which cannot
be diversified away.
10. This is not the case in the decentralized economy, as will become obvious below.
11. In the decentralized economy this would be equal to the risk-adjusted wage rate.
12. In an alternative approach, deterministic and stochastic flows could be treated at differentiated
rates, but this is beyond the scope of the present paper [see, e.g., Clemens and Soretz (1997, 2004)].
Also, we do not discuss state-dependent taxes and subsidies.
13. Recall that r = rs + risk premium.
14. A positive sign of rs is important for existence and uniqueness of the steady state. See also
Clemens (2009) for an extensive discussion of the feasibility of balanced growth paths in continuous-
time stochastic growth models with elastic labor supply.
15. As the comparative static results of variations in η, σ 2, and δ only get more complex without
changing the qualitative results already derived above for the planner economy, we concentrate on the
results for the policy instruments only.
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APPENDIX
A.1. PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3
The comparative statics of labor supply can be obtained by employing the implicit function
theorem to (23) to yield
d(1 − l)∗
dσ 2
= − l
δ
βB
1 − α
(1 − l)2α−1 Z
2 < 0, (A.1)
d(1 − l)∗
dδ
= ln l
B
< 0, (A.2)
d(1 − l)∗
dη
= l
δ
βB
1 − α
(1 − l)α
[
1 − 2σ 2(1 − l)1−αZ] dZ
dη
 0 for 1  2σ 2(1 − l)1−αZ,
(A.3)
with Z = (1 − η)ηη/(1−η) and
B = δ
l
+ α
1 − l +
σ 2Z 1−α
(1−l)α
1 − σ 2Z 1−α
(1−l)α
> 0 and
dZ
dη
= Z
(1 − η)2 ln η < 0.
The comparative statics of the growth rate follow from differentiation of (24) with respect to
the model parameters, taking into account the response of 1−l to changes in the parameters:
dg∗
dσ 2
= −(g∗ + β)1 − α
1 − l
dl
dσ 2
< 0, (A.4)
dg∗
dδ
= −(g∗ + β)1 − α
1 − l
dl
dδ
< 0, (A.5)
dg∗
dη
= −dZ
dη
(1 − l)1−α (1 − σ 2(1 − l)1−αZ) ( δ
l
+ α1−l
)
(
1 − σ 2(1 − l)1−αZ) ( δ
l
+ 11−l
)+ 1−α1−l σ 2(1 − l)1−αZ < 0. (A.6)

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A.2. OPTIMIZATION IN THE DECENTRALIZED ECONOMY
The budget constraint of the representative household is
dK =
(
Kα
[
¯K(1 − l)]1−α ¯P−η − C − A + T − τp
{
Kα
[
¯K(1 − l)]1−α
A
}
+ τ kK
)
dt
+
(
Kα
[
¯K(1 − l)]1−α ¯P−η − A + T − τp
{
Kα
[
¯K(1 − l)]1−α
A
}
+ τ kK
)
dz.
(A.7)
The stochastic Hamiltonian can be set up as follows:
H
(
C,K,A, l, λ,
∂λ
∂K
)
= e−βt
(
ln C + l
1−δ
1 − δ
)
+ λ
(
Kα ¯K1−α(1 − l)1−α ¯P−η − C
−A + T − τp
{
Kα
[
¯K(1 − l)]1−α
A
}
+ τ kK
)
+ σ
2
K
2
∂λ
∂K
,
where aggregate pollution is exogenous, and
σ 2K =
(
Kα
[
¯K(1 − l)]1−α aη − A + T − τp
{
Kα
[
¯K(1 − l)]1−α
A
}
+ τ kK
)2
σ 2. (A.8)
Maximization leads to the following FOCs, where we have already taken account of
P = 1/a and the government budget constraint (35):
∂H
∂C
= e−βtC−1 − λ = 0, (A.9)
∂H
∂l
= e−βt l−δ − λK 1 − α
1 − l
[
aη(1 − l)1−α − τ
p
aK
] [
1 + σ 2 ∂λ
∂K
K
λ
(1 − l)1−α(aη − a)
]
= 0, (A.10)
∂H
∂A
=
(
τp
1
aA
− 1
)[
1 + σ 2 ∂λ
∂K
K
λ
(1 − l)1−α(aη − a)
]
= 0, (A.11)
dλ = −∂H
∂K
dt + ∂λ
∂K
σKdz
= −λ
([
αaη(1 − l)1−α + τ k − α τ
p
aK
]{
1 + σ 2 ∂λ
∂K
K
λ
[
(1 − l)1−α(aη − a)]} dt
+ ∂λ
∂K
K
λ
[
(1 − l)1−α(aη − a)] dz) .
The first-order conditions (A.9) and (A.10) with respect to consumption and leisure are
identical in structure compared to the associated conditions of the planner problem. The
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pollution tax is tied to individually generated pollution. The representative agent knows
that he or she can avoid/reduce tax payments by voluntarily undertaking abatement efforts,
which is reflected in condition (A.11).
A.3. EXISTENCE OF THE GROWTH EQUILIBRIUM IN THE MARKET ECONOMY
A unique balanced growth path exists for the decentralized economy if
(i) the certainty equivalent to capital return is positive;
(ii)  is a continuous and monotonically increasing function in the domain l ∈ (0, 1);
(iii) the limits of  are of opposite sign:
sgn lim
(1−l)→0
 = −sgn lim
(1−l)→1
.
Differentiation of (43) with respect to 1 − l gives
∂
∂(1 − l) = −(1 − α)(1 − l)
−α [(τpA)η − τpA ]
×
[ {
1 − σ 2(1 − l)1−α [(τpA)η − τpA ]}
[
1 − α + lδ
(
δ
l
+ α
1 − l
)]
+ (1 − α)
(
1 + σ 2
{[(
τ
p
A
)η − τpA ]
(
lδ
1 − l − 1
)
+ τ k
})]
, (A.12)
which is negative for rs > 0. As can be seen from (39) and (41), a positive certainty
equivalent to capital return is required for growth and consumption to be feasible. The
second row of (A.12) is positive given (45).
The limits of  with respect to (1 − l) → 0 and (1 − l) → 1 are given by
lim
(1−l)→1
 = −β − {1 − σ 2 [(τpA)η − τpA ]} (1 − α) [(τpA)η − τpA ] < 0 and lim
(1−l)→0
 = ∞.
A.4. PROOF OF PROPOSITION 5
The comparative statics of labor supply with respect to the two policy instruments can be
derived by employing the implicit function theorem to (45), to yield
d(1 − l)
dτ k
= D
F
> 0, (A.13)
d(1 − l)
dτpA
= E
F
 0 for τpA  τ
p∗
A , (A.14)
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with
D = [1 − σ 2(1 − l)1−αG] > 0,
E = − dG
dτpA
(1 − l)1−α
[
(1 − α) [1 − 2σ 2(1 − l)1−αG] ( lδ
1 − l − 1
)
+ σ 2τ k
]
 0
for τp∗A  τ
p
A ,
F = (1 − α)(1 − l)−αG
{ [
1 − σ 2(1 − l)1−αG] [(1 − α) + lδ ( δ
l
+ α
1 − l
)]
+ σ 2
[
(1 − α)(1 − l)1−αG
(
lδ
1 − l − 1
)
+ τ k
]}
> 0,
where G = (τpA)η − τpA and therefore
dG
dτpA
= η(τpA)η−1 − 1  0 for τpA  τp∗A .
From (45), it follows that (1−α)lδ(1− l)−αG( lδ1−l −1)+τ k > 0. The sign of E depends on
1−2σ 2(1− l)1−αG. A sufficient condition for E to be positive [as postulated in (A.13) and
(A.14)] is 1 > 2σ 2(1− l)1−αG. In case this condition does not hold, i.e., if the second-order
part dominates the first-order one, the sign of E may switch.
The comparative statics of the growth rate can be obtained from differentiating (41) with
respect to the respective parameters and labor supply while considering the change of 1 − l
with respect to the tax and subsidy rates:
dg
dτpA
∣∣∣∣
τ
p∗
A
, τk∗
= dG
dτpA
(1 − α)(1 − l)1−2αG
F
[
α + σ 2(1 − α)(1 − l)1−α a (1 − η)
η
]
×
{[
1 − σ 2(1 − l)1−αG] lδ ( δ
l
+ 1
1 − l
)}
 0 for τpA  τ
p∗
A ,
dg
dτ k
∣∣∣∣
τ
p∗
A
, τk∗
=
[
α + σ 2(1 − α)(1 − l)1−α a (1 − η)
η
] [
d(1 − l)
dτ k
1 − α
(1 − l)α G
]
+[1 − σ 2(1 − l)1−αG] > 0.

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